Law on Searching for Extremist Materials: What Is New and Why It Matters
Since September 1, 2025, the Russian Federation has had a provision in the Code of Administrative Offences that provides for an administrative fine of 3000–5000 ₽ for the intentional search for knowingly extremist materials, including by using tools to bypass blocking. The list of such materials is maintained by the Ministry of Justice and published on its website.
The main practical question about the new provision is what counts as an “intentional” and “knowing” search. The law does not describe the technology for recording such activity, and the real scope of enforcement depends on exactly how the enforcing authority will prove the fact of a targeted search. Below we examine the mechanics of the provision, the currently known scenarios for its use, and the area of legal uncertainty.
This material does not call for any action and does not provide instructions for bypassing restrictions. Its purpose is to explain calmly how the provision works and what its formal boundaries are.
In short
- The provision has been in force since September 1, 2025; liability is administrative.
- The fine for citizens is 3000–5000 ₽.
- The offence requires intent and “knowledge” — a random click on a link is formally not covered.
- The list of extremist materials is maintained by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation; it is public and regularly updated.
- Using a VPN when searching is specified in the provision as an aggravating circumstance.
- The law does not describe the technical mechanisms for recording violations — this is an area of legal uncertainty.
What this is: how the provision works
The provision supplements Article 13 of Chapter 13 of the Code of Administrative Offences and establishes liability for searching for materials from the Ministry of Justice’s public list. The mere storage of extremist materials and their distribution are regulated by other provisions (Articles 20.3.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences, 280 and 282 of the Criminal Code). The new provision covers the “upper” part of the user funnel — the search stage.
Who maintains the list
The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation maintains the federal list of extremist materials. The list includes books, articles, videos, audio recordings, and symbols. The list is open and available on the Ministry of Justice website; additions are made on the basis of court decisions that have entered into force.
What “knowledge” means
Legally, “knowledge” means that a person knew the status of the material at the time of the action. In theory, this protects a random user who opened a link without knowing its contents. In practice, the criterion of “knowledge” is proven by a combination of factors: the wording of the search query, repeated visits to the same source, the presence of a VPN, and correspondence.
The role of VPN
The use of tools to bypass blocking is specified in the provision as an aggravating circumstance. This means that the mere fact of enabling a VPN does not constitute an offence — VPNs are legal in Russia — but together with a search query related to the Ministry of Justice list, it increases the weight of the evidence base.
Recording technology
The law does not describe exactly how the enforcing authority must establish the fact of a search. Theoretically possible sources include telecom operator logs (SORM), TSPU data (DPI), results of operational-search measures for specific individuals, and voluntary surrender of a device. In the first months, practice is very narrow — several high-profile cases involving the seizure of equipment, not mass recording.
What this means in practice
| Scenario | How it is interpreted | What to consider |
|---|---|---|
| Accidental click on a link from a feed | Formally does not constitute an offence — there is no intent | “Knowledge” must be proven |
| Search query with the exact title of material from the list | A sign of intent | The query is visible to the search engine and the provider |
| Studying materials for academic or journalistic purposes | The law does not make an exception based on purpose | Purpose is considered only when assessing guilt |
| Search using a VPN | Aggravating circumstance | A VPN is legal in itself |
| A teenager searches “what is this” | The offence is formally applicable from age 16+ | Proving intent for a teenager is more difficult |
| A phone is seized — the browser contains search history | The main source of evidence in current practice | Browser history is attached to the case as evidence |
How to check right now
A user’s own check comes down to two steps. First, see whether your name is in public repressive registries. Wanted Radar shows data from the wanted persons register of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs; searching by full name and date of birth takes a few seconds.
Second, review the Ministry of Justice list itself so you understand which materials the legislator classifies as extremist. This is not a “list of banned topics,” but a list of specific publications, films, books, and symbols with links to court decisions.
Check full name in the Ministry of Internal Affairs wanted register
Warning signs vs false alarm
Real prosecutions under the new provision today are isolated cases in which the search became known during a criminal case or the seizure of a device. Mass technical scanning of search queries on the operators’ side has not been recorded in public practice, and formally such a possibility is not provided for by the provision.
Rumors about “fines for every click” and anonymous chat messages about “reports already being issued” are, as a rule, not real cases. Administrative proceedings always leave an official documentary trail: a report on an administrative offence, and a ruling by a justice of the peace.
What to do next
- Review the current federal list of extremist materials on the Ministry of Justice website.
- Know that a VPN is legal in Russia in itself, but is included among the aggravating elements under the new provision.
- Remember the right to refuse to give explanations without a lawyer (Article 51 of the Constitution).
- If you are summoned for a report to be drawn up, contact a lawyer before signing any documents.
- Do not forward links to materials on the list in open chats and channels.
- Study current enforcement news on RBC and Interfax.
- Additional analysis of practice is published by Meduza (the resource is blocked in the Russian Federation and designated as a foreign agent).
Disclaimer: this material is informational and is not legal advice. For a specific situation, contact a lawyer. Information in registries is updated retroactively and may differ from the current situation.
Conclusion
The new provision of the Code of Administrative Offences for searching for extremist materials is currently applied selectively, and its key concepts — “intentional” and “knowing” search — are left to the discretion of the enforcing authority. This creates legal uncertainty in which the scope of liability depends on how practice develops in the coming months.
A calm position for the reader is to know the contents of the Ministry of Justice list, understand the role of VPN in the offence, and not treat rumors as facts. Wanted Radar helps answer the basic question — whether you appear in open wanted registers and repressive lists.