Post, like, repost: what digital traces are used in political cases
Criminal cases over social media posts are opened under several articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: 280 (calls for extremism), 282 (incitement of hatred), 205.2 (justification of terrorism), 207.3 (false information about the army), 280.3 (discrediting the army). Under each of them, the basis for criminal prosecution may be the text of a post, a repost, a comment, a story, or even a like — if the law enforcement authority considers it a form of dissemination.
Understanding the mechanics is important even for people who have not posted anything for a long time: materials from past years on social media do not “expire,” screenshots are kept by other people, and a linguistic examination may classify as “dissemination” an action that the author did not consider as such. Criminal cases for publications from 2014–2018 are still being opened in 2025.
Below: exactly which actions are treated as dissemination, how the content of a post is recorded, what role linguistic examination plays, and why deleting a publication is not the same as deleting evidence. The tone is dry: the task is to describe the practice, not to assess it.
In brief
- The main Criminal Code articles used for publications: 280, 280.3, 282, 205.2, 207.3.
- Courts recognize a post, repost, story, and sometimes a like or comment as “dissemination.”
- How a post is recorded: a screenshot by a security officer, a notarial inspection of a page, an operational-search measures report.
- Deleting a publication does not close a case: cache, web archives, screenshots, and copies held by recipients remain.
- Linguistic examination is key evidence in “speech-based” articles.
- Limitation periods for serious offenses are up to 10–15 years; a 2015 post can become a 2025 case.
What counts as “dissemination” in practice
Russian courts interpret dissemination of information broadly. To open a case, it is enough for a text or image to become available to at least one person other than the author. This means that a closed channel with ten subscribers formally falls under the offense in the same way as a post on a public page.
Post and repost
This is the basic scenario: the author placed material in an open or closed account. A repost is treated the same as publication, and the argument “I only reposted it” does not work in court: each person who made the material available further bears responsibility.
Stories, statuses, temporary publications
The fact that a publication disappears after 24 hours does not matter. A screenshot taken before deletion is the main evidence; while it existed, the story was public, which is enough for qualification.
Comment and like
Comments under other people’s publications are prosecuted as a standalone offense. Likes on disputed materials less often become the central evidence, but they appear in cases as indirect evidence — especially when likes are placed en masse.
Private correspondence
Messenger correspondence enters a case through inspection of a seized phone or through copies obtained by operational-search measures. Technically, closed correspondence turns into public material at the moment the device is seized.
What this means in practice
| Social media action | How it is interpreted | What to check / do |
|---|---|---|
| Wall post with text about events | Independent dissemination | Keep the exact publication date and context |
| Repost of someone else’s post | Dissemination on the same level as the author | Record the original and the author of the primary source |
| Story deleted after a day | Screenshot = evidence; deletion does not help | Take into account that copies may have gone to subscribers |
| Comment under someone else’s post | May be a standalone offense | Save the thread URL and the discussion context |
| Like on prohibited material | More often indirect evidence; in rare cases, primary evidence | Consider it in the overall picture of the digital footprint |
| Telegram correspondence about a publication | Confirms intent if the phone is seized | Remember metadata and cloud copies |
How to check right now
The first thing that makes sense to do is understand which public registers you or your loved ones currently appear in. Wanted Radar shows data about people from the wanted list register of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (source — Mediazona (Медиазона)). Searching by full name and date of birth takes a few seconds and does not require registration.
At the same time, check whether the surname is mentioned in the Ministry of Justice register of foreign agents and in the Rosfinmonitoring list of terrorists and extremists — these are separate databases, with their own mechanics and consequences.
Warning signs vs false alarm
A real warning sign is a summons to the Investigative Committee or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a subpoena citing a specific article, a search, or seizure of equipment. Rumors in chats about “lists” and anonymous threats by email are, as a rule, not an indicator of a real case. Criminal prosecution always leaves an official documentary trace: a decision to open a case, reports, subpoenas.
A matching full name in open databases is a separate case. A person with the same surname, a person with the same date of birth, or an erroneous entry can occur, so findings in registers should be treated as a reason to check, not as confirmation of a case against you specifically.
What to do next
- Do not panic and do not mass-delete old publications retroactively — this is preserved in logs and cache.
- If an investigative action is planned or already under way, contact a lawyer before the first interrogation.
- Check yourself and your loved ones in Wanted Radar and in the official registers of the Ministry of Justice and Rosfinmonitoring.
- Keep copies of all documents and subpoenas — this is the basis for appeals.
- Understand that calls to “hotlines” and “attempts to explain yourself” without a lawyer do not work in the accused person’s favor.
- Study the procedure for appealing decisions and legal qualification — the general rules are described on OVD-Info (resource blocked in the Russian Federation).
- Do not hand over account passwords without procedural documents — seizure must be carried out under a report.
Disclaimer: this material is informational and is not legal advice. For a specific situation, contact a lawyer.
Conclusion
The digital footprint on social media is structured in such a way that it cannot be removed retroactively: even a deleted publication remains in screenshots, archives, and operators’ logs. Defense is built not on deletion, but on knowledge of procedure, on a lawyer, and on a calm understanding of which specific actions may become the subject of a case. Mediazona regularly publishes a detailed overview of practice in donation and repost cases at Mediazona (resource blocked in the Russian Federation).
Wanted Radar helps answer the basic question — whether you or your loved ones appear in open state wanted registers and repressive lists. This does not replace work with a lawyer, but it gives a starting point for further steps.